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Department of Computer Science, Old Dominion University,
Norfolk, VA 23529-0162, USA
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ABSTRACT
Our main contribution is a novel approach to enhancing po-
sition security in VANET. We achieve local and global posi-
tion security by using the on-board radar to detect neighbor-
ing vehicles and to confirm their announced coordinates. We
compute cosine similarity among data collected by radar and
neighbors’ reports to filter the forged data from the truthful
data. Based on filtered data, we create a history of vehicle
movement. By checking the history and computing similar-
ity, we can prevent a large number of Sybil attacks and some
combinations of Sybil and position-based attacks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.20[Computer-
Communication Network]: General-Security and protections
General Terms: Design, Security
Keywords: Vehicular ad hoc networks, security, radar
1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle position is one of the most valuable pieces of infor-
mation in a Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET). Adver-
saries, such as pranksters and malicious attackers [1], may
harm the VANET by modifying existing packets or insert-
ing bogus packets. Specially, an attacker may create the
illusion of a traffic jam before selecting an alternate route
to his advantage. The attacker could also replay packets,
pretending to be at a fake position to create the illusion of
a bona-fide vehicle. Another well-known attack is the Sybil
attack [2] which is launched by forging multiple identities.
This attack gives the illusion of numerous cars in the traffic
and may have a serious effect on VANET, such as network
connection, bandwidth consumption, and even a threat of
life.
Interestingly, on-board radar is already used in advanced
cruise control systems [3]. It is natural, therefore, to enlist
the help of these devices for the purpose of enhancing the
security of the information flow in VANET. A classic exam-
ple of “anti-social” behavior in VANET is for malicious cars
to fake their true position. Our main contribution is to show
that by using GPS and radar-provided information one can
ensure the validity of position information in the VANET by
detecting and isolating malicious. Underlying our solution
is the famous adage: “Seeing is believing”. We use on-board
radar as the virtual “eye” of a vehicle. Although the “eye-
sight” is limited due to modest radar transmission range, a
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vehicle can “see” surrounding vehicles and hear reports of
their GPS coordinates. By comparing what is heard and
seen to what has been reported, a vehicle can corroborate
the real position of neighbors and isolate malicious vehicles
to achieve local security. Due to the inherent limitation of
radar spatial penetration, we need to combine local secu-
rity with global security. We use preset position-based cells
(through which we achieve local security) to create a commu-
nication network by exchanging messages among cells and
verifying vehicles’ position using the oncoming traffic’s on-
board radar. In this way, we achieve global security. An
observer vehicle stores position data in a time series to form
a movement history of the observed vehicles. The move-
ment history can help determine whether new received data
is valid or not. We isolate vehicles which send invalid data.
This isolation can help to prevent a large number of position-
based attacks, Sybil attacks, and some combinations of po-
sition and Sybil attacks.
2. THE SYSTEMMODEL
Vehicles represented in this paper are assumed to have
following features: 1) A GPS navigation system including a
GPS receiver and GPS maps; 2) A front and a rear radar.
We assume that the omni-directional front radar can de-
tect neighboring cars within line of sight in a radius of 200
meters. 3) A computer center, which will provide data pro-
cessing, computing and storage; 4) A wireless transceiver,
using Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) for
communications; 5) A unique ID, such as an electronic li-
cense plate which is issued by a registration authority. We
assume that vehicles can lie about their GPS positions and
their unique IDs. If an attacker changes its GPS position, a
position attack is launched. If an attacker forges a vehicle’s
ID, a Sybil attack is launched. In some cases, a combination
of these two attacks can be launched.
3. LOCAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY
We combine proactive and reactive corroboration using
radar to get the relative velocity, angle and position to the
target object. When an observer vehicle does not receive
any packets from a observed vehicle in a certain period of
time, a timeout counter will increase by one. If the timeout
counter increases beyond a threshold, the observer vehicle
will transmit a radar signal to test the observed vehicle’s
position. Radar detection will also be triggered at a random
time during the on-going communication with a vehicle. The
rationale for this latter strategy is to ensure that a trusted
vehicle remains trustworthy.
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Since GPS has precision tolerance, there is a region of
possible values for the real GPS position as shown in Figure
1. Similarly, there is a possible region for data detected by
radar. If there is an intersection between the GPS position
(dark shadow) and radar position (light shadow), this means
the actual GPS position is very close the value which is
detected by radar. Therefore, we claim that we can accept
the GPS position.
Figure 1: Con rming GPS coordinates with GPS and
radar position
Vehicles are grouped into preset cells based on their GPS
location. Global security is based on the fact that vehi-
cles in the same cell see and hear almost the same traffic
and road situation, so any modification done by malicious
nodes can be detected by other honest vehicles. These hon-
est vehicles then broadcast the correct record and isolate the
malicious vehicle. Locally secured position and speed infor-
mation needs to be propagated so that other vehicles ap-
proaching the cell can benefit from it. We have chosen a cell
router for each direction, which is responsible for forwarding
this information, to minimize collisions and bandwidth us-
age. When a remote vehicle’s position needs to be verified,
a request can be propagated to a position where radar can
be used. The result is propagated back the requester.
4. MAP HISTORY
Each vehicle in a cell knows the exact position of all the re-
maining vehicles in a cell by exchanging packets. Vehicles in
a cell can query the position of a specified vehicle among the
neighbors in the cell. When receiving responses from neigh-
bors and computing these positions, the requester comes to
an agreement about all the neighbors’ position. With lo-
cally radar-detected data, oncoming traffic’s radar detected
data, and trusted neighbors’s data in hand, we apply cosine
similarity to these data. If the similarity value is above a
threshold, we accept the data, otherwise it is dropped. With
the accepted data, we build a history of vehicle movements,
or a Map History. The Map History of a remote vehicle is
built in the observer vehicle’s memory. The basic idea is that
a vehicle without position history is not trustable, just like a
person without credit history can not obtain a loan. When
receiving a position announcement, the observer checks the
Map History to verify the position based on movement con-
sistency. For example, if a computed position is outside of
the road (position A in Figure 2), then based on the Map
History, it is rejected. If the position is supposed to be be-
tween t0 − t1, but it reports position B in Figure 2, then it
is rejected.
Figure 2: Map history examples
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
We developed a microscopic traffic simulator based on a
Java-based microscopic transport simulator from the Dres-
den University of Technology [4], which features a realistic
traffic model. We simulated a 3000 meter highway. We
can investigate the number of compromised vehicles to be
detected and the time to find these compromised vehicles.
The total road length is 3 Km with 2 lanes in 2 directions.
The cell radius is 100 meters, traffic arrival rate is 1800 ve-
hicles/hour, mean velocity is 33.3 m/s, and transmission
radius is 100 meters. We studied the time to detect 20
compromised vehicles with 60%, 80% and 90% of the to-
tal vehicles being compromised. Compromised vehicles are
randomly distributed in the system. When there are fewer
than 16 compromised vehicles, the time required to detect
them does not change with their percentage of the traffic.
If there are more than 16 compromised vehicles, the lower
the percentage is, the longer it takes to find them because
they are more sparsely distributed and need more hops to
be detected.
Figure 3: Time to detect compromised vehicles.
6. FUTUREWORK
We are working on increasing the precision of our system
to detect all the compromised vehicles and on simulating
the Sybil attack and some combination of Sybil attacks and
position attacks.
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